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Limiting a Surrogate's Authority to Terminate Life-Support for
an Incompetent Adult
A twenty-nine-year-old mentally and physically disabled woman,
Ms. Tina Cartrette, is the subject of a legal battle in North Carolina
over whether her mother, as the surrogate decision-maker, may direct
the termination of artificial nutrition and hydration. Cartrette has
never been competent, but she is neither terminally ill' nor in a
persistent vegetative state (PVS).2 Cartrette's mother decided to
terminate artificial nutrition and hydration3 following Cartrette's
1. For the purposes of this Recent Development, terminal illness means a condition
with a predictably fatal progression likely to cause death within one year. E.g., Deborah
K. McKnight & Maureen Bellis, Foregoing Life-support for Adult, Developmentally
Disabled,Public Wards:A Proposed Statute, 18 AM. J. L. & MED. 203, 207 (1992) (citing
THE HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE SUSTAINING
TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING).

2. In re Cartrette, No. 90-SP-35 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 14,2000) (findings of fact); see
Karen Garloch, Life-support Ruling Sends "Shock Waves," Doctor Says, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Jan. 10, 2001, at LEXIS, Domestic News Library, Charlotte Observer File (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). For the purpose of this Recent Development,
PVS means "a medical condition whereby ... the patient suffers from a sustained
complete loss of self-aware cognition and, without the use of extraordinary means ... will
succumb to death within a short period of time." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(a)(4) (1999);
see also In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1987) (defining a PVS patient as no longer
self-aware or aware of her surroundings "in a learned manner"); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647, 654 (NJ. 1976) (stating that a PVS patient has the "capacity to maintain the
vegetative parts of neurological function but.., no longer has any cognitive function"); G.
Bryan Young, M.D. & Susan E. Pigott, Ph.D., NeurobiologicalBasis of Consciousness,56
ARCH. NEUROL. 153, 154 (1999) (describing a PVS patient as alert but not aware, capable
of being "aroused from sleep, with eye opening and electroencephalographic arousal," but
without "perception, comprehension, meaningful interaction, or behavioral response").
3. Artificial nutrition and hydration is a form of life-support, which includes any
medical treatment aimed at forestalling death, regardless of whether the treatment is
intended to affect the patient's underlying disease. See THE COUNCIL OF ETHICAL &
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS'N., CURRENT OPINIONS 2.20 (1989), available at
http:llwww.ama-assn.orglamalpub/category/2513.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2001) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) (discussing ethical issues related to withholding life
support) [hereinafter CURRENT OPINIONS]; American Academy of Pediatrics, Guidelines
on Forgoing Life-sustaining Medical Treatment (RE9406), 93 PEDIATRICS 532-36 (Mar.,
1994), available at http:llwww.aap.orglpolicy/00118.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2001) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). Many courts and commentators reject any
distinction between withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration and withdrawal of
other forms of life-support, such as antibiotics and respiratory aids. E.g., Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 288-89 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 637 (Mass. 1986); In re Jobes,
529 A.2d at 444 n.9; Delio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 687-88
(1987); Lynn & Childress, Must PatientsAlways be Given Food and Water?, 13 HASTINGS
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hospitalization for infection, high fever, and seizures
The
Governor's Advocacy Council for Persons with Disabilities
(GACPD) challenged that decision.5 At a hearing on December 12,
2000, the Clerk of the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, North
6
Carolina, ordered the continuation of life-support for Cartrette.
Because Cartrette was neither "terminal and incurable," nor in a
PVS, the only conditions specified in the North Carolina Right to
Natural Death Law under which life-support may be withdrawn, 7 the
clerk found that termination of her life-support constituted neglect.'
On appeal, the Superior Court vacated the order, finding as a matter
of law that the mother's decision to terminate life-support did not
constitute neglect. 9
Cartrette's case raises questions regarding the circumstances
under which a surrogate decision maker can withhold or withdraw
life-support (such as hydration and nutrition) from a never-competent
adult, and under what standards that decision should be evaluated.
The issue of whether the guardian of a patient has the authority to
terminate life support when the patient has never been competent,
but is neither terminally ill, nor in a PVS has never been litigated in
North Carolina. After examining the standards courts outside North
Carolina use to evaluate a surrogate's decision to refuse medical
treatment on behalf of an incompetent adult,10 this Recent
CrR. REP. 17, 20 (1983); Alan Meisel, Barriersto Forgoing Nutrition and Hydration in
Nursing Homes, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 335,379-80 (1995).
4. Cartrette has cerebral palsy, and the extent of her cognitive and physical abilities
is recognition of her own name and the ability to track with her eyes the movements of
residential care facility employees-she is non-ambulatory and non-communicative.
Garloch, supra note 2. In November 2000, Cartrette developed a high fever and seizures
in response to frequently occurring infections, and she temporarily required the aid of a
respirator. Id. When her condition stabilized and the respirator was removed, Cartrette
continued to breathe independently and returned to her baseline condition. Id.
5. The GACPD had authority to act on Cartrette's behalf pursuant to section 143B403.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes.
6. In re Cartrette, No. 90-SP-35 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2000) (granting an
emergency ex parte motion to restore nutrition and hydration, and to remove Cartrette's
mother as guardian).
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320- 90-322 (a)(1) (1999).
8. In re Cartrette, No. 90-SP-35 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2000); Garloch, supra note
2. Section 35A-1290(b)(3) of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that the clerk
may remove a guardian who "neglects to care for" the ward, as required under Section
35A-1241(a). Id. § 35A-1290(b)(3) (1999). The statute, however, does not define
"neglect" as it would pertain to a guardian's decision to terminate medical treatment. The
statute specifically requires only that the guardian act non-negligently and in good faith.
Idt. § 35A-1241(c)(2) (1999).
9. In re Cartrette, No. 90-SP-35 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 14,2001).
10. See infra notes 39-56 and accompanying text.
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Development suggests that the best interest test should be adopted in
In re Cartrette, and the result should be the continuation of treatment
in this case.11
Preliminary to any discussion of how an incompetent patient can
refuse life-support is whether such a patient has a legally recognized
right to refuse treatment at all.12 Competent individuals have a right
to refuse medical treatment, even if such treatment is required to
sustain the individual's life. 3 Courts recognize that this right to
refuse treatment extends to incompetent patients, 4 who are by
definition unable to make their own decisions regarding medical care.
Incompetent adults may exercise this right through a surrogate
decision maker." The right to refuse treatment for both competent
11. See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
12. This Recent Development focuses on surrogate decision-making on behalf of
For the purposes of this Recent Development, an
never-competent patients.
"incompetent adult" means "an adult or emancipated minor who lacks sufficient capacity
to manage the adult's own affairs or to make or communicate important decisions
concerning the adult's person, family, or property." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35A-1101(7)
(1999).
13. E.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(recognizing a competent adult's right to refuse "any medical treatment even that which
may save or prolong her life") (emphasis in original); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160,
164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (recognizing a competent patient's right to demand removal
of his respirator); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (N.J. 1985) ("Competent persons
generally are permitted to refuse medical treatment, even at the risk of death."); In re
Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64,71 (N.Y. 1981) (recognizing a competent adult's right to refuse even
life-sustaining medical treatment by holding that a doctor cannot be held ethically liable
for honoring the patient's wishes). Patients have the right to refuse any medical treatment
that prolongs life, including respirators, dialysis, antibiotics, and blood transfusions, and
patients have the right to receive pain medication even though it might effectively
expedite their death. MARGARET C. JASPER, THE RIGHT TO DIE 29-30 (2d ed. 2000).
14. See John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla.
1984) (stating that terminally ill patients should not lose their right to discontinue life
support when they become incompetent); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427 (Mass. 1977) (recognizing that the liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment extends to incompetent as well as competent
patients because "the value of human dignity extends to both"); Spahn v. Eisenberg, 563
N.W.2d 485, 489 (Wis. 1997) (recognizing that the same constitutional rights extend to
incompetent as well as competent adults).
15. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,280 (1990) (recognizing the
need for a surrogate to exercise an incompetent person's right to refuse treatment); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (NJ. 1976) (allowing the patient's guardian or family to decide
whether the patient would exercise her right is the only practical way to avoid destruction
of the right altogether); McKnight & Bellis, supra note 1, at 213 (suggesting that nevercompetent patients have a "right to have appropriate medical decisions made on their
behalf" rather than a right to refuse treatment, per se). The North Carolina statute
provides that a patient's guardian has the authority to consent to medical treatment on the
patient's behalf if the guardian acts in good faith and non-negligently. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 35A-1241(c)(1)-(2) (1999). Similar statutes in other states have been interpreted to give
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and incompetent patients is often based on common law notions of
self-determination1 6 and informed consent, 7 the protections afforded
individuals in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, 8 and state constitutional 9 and statutory provisions!'
The right to refuse treatment, however, is not absolute-it may
be limited by legitimate state interests 2 l The Supreme Court has
the guardian authority to refuse treatment. Rasmussen By Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d
674, 687-88 (Ariz. 1987) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-5312(A)(3) (Supp. 1986) and
finding that the guardian's right to consent to delivery of medical care provided therein
necessarily includes the right to consent to withholding medical care); Conservatorship of
Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (finding the same in CAL. PROB.
§ 2355(a)); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 337 (Minn. 1984) (citing MINN. STAT. § 525.56
(3)(4)(a) (1982) for the same).
16. See, e.g., Foody v. Manchester Mem'l Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 717-18 (Conn. 1984)
(acknowledging that the right to self-determination includes the right of incompetent
adults to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 436 (N.J.
1987) ("patient's right to self determination is the guiding principle in determining
whether to continue or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment").
17. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277 ("[T]he common-law doctrine of informed
consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent individual to refuse
medical treatment."); Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26 (basing the right on the common
law right to informed consent and constitutional right of privacy); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d
at 70 (basing the right to refuse on the common law right to informed consent); see also
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997) (noting the right to refuse life-saving
nutrition and hydration derives from the common law rule that forced medication
constitutes battery).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (suggesting
that the refusal of lifesaving medical treatment is a liberty interest that can be inferred
from the Fourteenth Amendment); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663 (basing the right to
refuse treatment on the right to privacy guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution and the
New Jersey State Constitution).
19. See, e.g., Fleming, 741 P.2d at 682 (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 8); Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (citing CAL. CONST. art.
1, § 1); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (citing
FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23); In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 39 (Ind. 1991) (citing IND.
CONST. art. I, par. 1); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663 (citing N.J. CONST. art. I, par. 1);
Lenz v. L.E. Phillips Career Dev. Ctr., 482 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1992) (citing WIS. CONST. art.
§ 1).
20. See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/5 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000) (Health Care
Surrogate Act); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320 (1999) (Right to Natural Death Act);
Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (citing CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186); McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc.,
553 A.2d 596,602 (Conn. 1989) (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19A-571); Estate of Longeway
v. Community Convalescent Ctr., 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (Ill. 1989) (citing Illinois Probate
Act); In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 38 (citing Indiana's Health Care Consent Act).
21. Courts have articulated four countervailing state interests-the interests in
"preserving life, preventing suicide, safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession
and protecting innocent third parties"-that may limit an individual's freedom to refuse
medical treatment. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985) (citing Satz v.
Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. 1987)); see also In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115, 123

2001]

TERMINATING LIFE-SUPPORT

1819

recognized that, under certain circumstances, legitimate
countervailing state interests may overcome an individual's right to
refuse medical treatmentP Specifically, in Cartrette's case, the state
has interests in the protection of human life,2 the prevention of
discrimination against disabled persons by those who would devalue
the disabled person's life, or view that person as too burdensome,2 4
and the prevention of homicide and assisted suicide.'
As the
Supreme Court has acknowledged, however, that "the State's interest
...weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree
of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. 21 6 Cartrette's
prognosis, however, remains relatively the same as it has been since
birth.

Because Cartrette's case involves a never-competent patient who
is neither PVS, nor terminally ill, the state's interests may outweigh
the patient's right to refuse treatment through a surrogate. In cases
involving abortion and blood transfusion, courts frequently have
approved of states restricting individual rights to protect a vulnerable
life incapable of protecting itself.2 7 Even if these state interests are
insufficient to outweigh Cartrette's right to refuse life-support, they
should at least be sufficient to impose safeguards to ensure that the

(Mass. 1980); Comm'r of Correction v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Mass. 1979);
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425; In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339 (Minn. 1984); In re Colyer,
660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING

TO FOREGO LIFE-SUPPORT 31-32 (1983); Carol Ann Colabrese, Note, In re Storar: The
Right to Die and Incompetent Patients,43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1087, 1092 (1982).
22. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1977) (acknowledging that
compelling state interests may overcome individual liberty interests); see also In re Farrell,
529 A.2d 404, 411 (NJ. 1987) (acknowledging the state's interest in preserving human
life); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71 (N.Y. 1981) (stating that a patient's right to refuse
medical treatment may "yield to superior State interests," such as the interest in
preserving human life).
23. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,282 (1990).
24. See Spahn v. Eisenberg, 563 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Wis. 1997) (quoting BARRY R.
FURROW, ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 325 (1991)).
25. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728-29; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
26. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (NJ. 1976); see also In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434,
444 (N.J. 1987) (quoting In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419,427 (N.J. 1987)) (finding it unlikely that
any State interest could be strong enough to subordinate a PVS patient's right to
terminate life-support).
27. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (authorizing state restrictions on
right to abortion to protect viable fetus); State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751, 757-59 (N.J.
1962) (authorizing restriction on parents' ability to refuse blood transfusion for their
infant). In Cartrette's case, the court would be restricting the surrogate's ability to act on
behalf of a never-competent patient, indirectly restricting the patient's right to refuse
treatment.
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surrogate's decision to terminate treatment is medically, legally, and
ethically appropriate. 2
North Carolina statutes provide one such safeguard; however,
the scope of the provisions does not cover Cartrette's case. North
Carolina recognizes, by statute, the rights of both competent and29

incompetent individuals to consent to or refuse medical treatment,
and the ability of surrogates to exercise those rights on behalf of

incompetent individuals.3 0 The Right to Natural Death Act provides
some guidance in North Carolina for evaluating a surrogate's decision
to terminate life support.31 The Act provides that life-support may be

withheld or withdrawn from a patient who is either mentally
incapacitated or comatose with no reasonable chance of returning to
a cognitive state,32 when two physicians determine that the patient is
terminal and incurable or in a PVS. 33 These statutory provisions,
however, do not apply to Cartrette's case, because though she is
mentally incapacitated, her treating physicians have neither declared
her in a terminal and incurable condition nor in a PVS. 34 The Act,
however, is not conclusive. It was established, in part, to provide
health care practitioners with an absolute defense if they abide by the
statute's procedures, but it was not intended to set forth an exclusive

procedure for evaluating a surrogate's decision to terminate lifesupport. In light of this non-exclusivity, one should consider other
28. See In re Truesdell, 313 N.C. 421, 430-31, 329 S.E.2d 630, 636 (1985) (recognizing
that the patient's guardian does not have absolute discretion to act on the ward's behalfthe guardian must act in the ward's best interests, and his actions are subject to judicial
review); see also In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, 307 N.W.2d 881, 896 (Wis. 1981)
(recognizing that severely mentally retarded persons deserve special protection from the
state when a surrogate makes an irreversible medical decision on their behalf because they
are a distinct class albeit with the same constitutional rights as competent persons).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-15(a) (1999). The statute recognizes an individual's
fundamental right to control medical care decisions, including the right to "give, withhold,
or withdraw consent to medical treatment." Id § 32A-15(c); see id. § 90-321(b) (2000)
(allowing a patient to refuse life-prolonging extraordinary means, including nutrition and
hydration, if the patient is ever terminally and incurably ill or in a PVS).
30. Id. § 32A-15 (1999); id. § 90-320.
31. Id. § 90-322(a) (1999).
32. Id.
33. Id. § 90-322(a)(1)-(2).
34. In re Cartrette, No. 90-SP-35 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 14,2000).
35. Cartrette's physicians and Cartrette's mother's attorney, bolstering their argument
with a North Carolina State Attorney General's opinion, see Right to a Natural Death:
Procedures for Natural Death in the Absence of a Declaration, Op. Att'y Gen., (Jan. 5,
1995), at http://www.jus.state.nc.usllr/agfopn.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2001) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review), contended that although the law permits withholding
life support under those conditions, "it does not exclude other decisions." Garloch, supra
note 2.
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means of allowing Cartrette, or her guardian, to exercise her right to
refuse medical treatment, as well as any safeguards to ensure the
propriety of the decision.
The North Carolina courts should consider how other states have
adjudicated similar issues. Cartrette's situation parallels reports of
guardians' decisions to withdraw or withhold life support from
incompetent patients though none are exactly on point in other
states. 6 Cases from other jurisdictions resolving such disputes can be
divided into the following two variables: (1) whether the patient
previously indicated an inclination toward or against medical
treatment, whether the patient failed to indicate her wishes, or was
never-competent to do so, 37 and (2) whether the patient was in a PVS
or terminally ill condition, or in neither condition.38
Although
Cartrette is a never-competent patient who is neither in a PVS nor

36. See In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1031 (E.D. Va. 1993) (holding that physicians
cannot withhold life-support from an anencephalic infant against the mother's wishes);
HCA, Inc. v. Miller, 36 S.W.2d 187, 191-92 (Tex. App. 2000) (citing TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.002(13), 166.031, 166.035 (Vernon Supp. 2000) to support a
parental right to refuse life-support for a child only when the child's condition is certifiably
terminal"); see also Maura Dolan, Out of a Coma, Into a Twilight, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2,
2001, at Al (discussing the dispute between the mother and wife of a "minimally
conscious" car accident victim over whether his verbally conveyed wishes should be
effectuated by terminating his life-support); Anita Kumar, Lawyer Dies Amid Feud Over
His Living Will, ST.PETERSBURG TIMES (Florida), Nov. 2, 2000, at 1B (discussing heartattack patient's wife's legal battle with patient's mother and children over whether to
continue life-prolonging treatment in light of the patient's living will); Richard Willing,
Who Decides Whether a Baby Lives or Dies, USA TODAY, Nov. 29,2000, at IA (reporting
a Texas hospital overruling parents' decision not to put their premature and disabled baby
on life-support).
37. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
431 (Mass. 1977) (applying the substitute judgment test to determine whether to withhold
chemotherapy from a never-competent patient); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 64,72 (N.J. 1976)
(holding that a formerly competent patient-now in a PVS-failed to sufficiently indicate
her wishes regarding treatment upon a comatose state); In re Eichner, 420 N.E.2d 64, 68
(N.Y. 1981) (holding that a formerly competent patient-now in a PVS-previously
indicated desire not to be kept alive in a persistent vegetative state).
38. E.g., John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984)
(terminally ill patient); Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 417 (terminally ill patient); In re Jobes,
529 A.2d 434 (NJ. 1987) (PVS patient); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976) (PVS
patient); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981) (terminally ill patient); see In re
Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 608 (N.Y. 1988) (concerning a surrogate
decision-maker for patient with irreparable brain damage, but not unconscious or PVS,
who was unable to prevent physicians from inserting feeding tube for patient because
patient had never expressed her wishes specifically regarding nutrition and hydration).
Courts distinguish between PVS and non-PVS incompetent patients because PVS patients
have no hope of recovering any cognitive functioning, and they are generally unable to
sense pain. See supra note 2; see also Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744,760 (1993) (quoting 73
Op. Att'y Gen. 162,189-90 (Md. 1988)).
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terminally ill, cases falling under the other categories provide
guidance in resolving her case.
The substitute judgment test and the best interests test are the
predominant standards used to evaluate the propriety of a guardian's
decision to terminate life support for an incompetent patient. 9 The
substitute judgment test is a subjective approach. It attempts to
respect the patient's autonomy and self-determination by effectuating
the decision that the patient would have made regarding withholding
or withdrawal of life-support. 4
An alternative to the subjective substitute judgment test is an
objective "best interests test," which requires the surrogate to
demonstrate to the court that terminating life-support serves the
patient's best interests.4 ' In contrast to the substitute judgment test,
this test more aptly applies to patients who have given no indication
39. CURRENT OPINIONS, supra note 3 (discussing the application of the substitute
judgment and best interests tests). But see Susan Busby-Mott, The Trend Towards
Enlightenment: Health Care Decisionmaking in Lawrence and Doe, 25 CONN. L. REV.
1159, 1175 (1993) (suggesting a third standard-the family-based model-which allows
family members to decide unilaterally that the patient would have made the same
decision). Justice O'Connor suggested that the states can develop their own standards for
evaluating the propriety of a guardian's decision to terminate life-support for an
incompetent adult, and that imposing a clear and convincing evidentiary standard is
constitutionally acceptable but not required. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261,292 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
40. Rasmussen By Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 688 (Ariz. 1987); Mack v. Mack,
618 A.2d 744, 757 (Md. 1993); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 436-37 (N.J. 1987); Busby-Mott,
supra note 36, at 1171. The substitute judgment test subjectively focuses on the patient's
previously expressed desires and requires that the patient was competent at some point
and in fact expressed those desires with some degree of specificity. Fleming, 741 P.2d at
688; Busby-Mott, supra note 36, at 1171. Though courts recognize that never-competent
patients have a right to refuse treatment, see supra note 14 and accompanying text, states
applying the substitute judgment test, whether requiring the guardian to demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence what the patient
would have wanted, essentially leave the never-competent patient unable to exercise this
right. See Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 768 (Md. 1993) (Chasanow, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority's imposition of the substitute judgment test because it denies
never-competent patients court authorization to forego life support); PRESIDENT'S
OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN BIOMEDICAL AND
TO FOREGO LIFE-SUPPORT 132-36 (1983)
[hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION] (recommending the best interest test be applied
COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY
BEHAVIORAL

RESEARCH,

DECIDING

for never-competent patients because it would be impossible for a surrogate to meet the
evidentiary requirements of the substitute judgment test).
41. See Spahn v. Eisenberg, 563 N.W.2d 486, 486 (Wis. 1997); Lenz v. L.E. Phillips
Career Dev. Ctr., 482 N.W.2d 60, 70 (Wis. 1992); Foody v. Manchester Mem'l Hosp., 482
A.2d 713, 721 (Conn. 1984). But see Robert M. Veatch, Limits of Guardian Treatment
Refusal: A Reasonableness Standard, 9 AM. J. L. & MED. 427, 448 (1984) (suggesting
courts should allow bonded guardians to act on behalf of never-competent patients using
the best interest test plus the guardian's own subjective values).
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of what their desires would be under the circumstances. Under the
best interests test, the court can consider factors other than the
patient's expressed desires to determine what treatment decision is in
the patient's best interest. Such factors include the terminal nature of
the patient's condition, the possible adverse side effects of lifeprolonging treatment, the discomfort caused by treatment, the
psychological impact of treatment on a patient incapable of
understanding why such intrusive treatment is being imposed, the
chance that treatment will facilitate recovery, and the treating
physician's recommendation.42 The court weighs the burden of
treatment against the benefits of continued life under the patient's
If the burdens significantly outweigh the
given condition.
effectiveness and benefits of treatment, the court may find
termination of life support justified. 43
Although both the substitute judgment test and the best interests
test have been applied to evaluate decision-making on behalf of
never-competent patients,' both tests present problems when applied
to such patients. Because these patients have never been able to
appreciate or articulate the life or death decision of whether to
withdraw life-support under their current condition, the substitute
judgment test is inappropriate. 45
Although the best interests test is arguably more suitable for
never-competent patients than the substitute judgment test because it
allows consideration of factors other than the patient's previously
expressed wishes, 46 it is still problematic because it opens the door to
result-oriented decision-making and abuse of discretion by the
guardian,47 and may make termination of care too easy.48 Advocates
42. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 43435 (Mass. 1977) (describing factors the probate judge considered in determining whether
to withhold chemotherapy from a terminally ill incompetent adult); Foody v. Manchester
Mem'l Hosp., 482 A.2d 713,719 (Conn. 1984) ("Whether serious burdens of treatment are
worth enduring should depend upon how long the treatment will extend life and under
what conditions.").
43. See also Edmund D. Pellegrino, MD, Decisions to Withdraw Life-support, 283
JAMA 1065, 1066 (2000) (discussing clinical futility, defined as the relationship among
effectiveness, benefit, and burden of the treatment, as the central criterion for determining
when to terminate treatment).
44. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431 (applying the substitute judgment test).
45. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla. 1984)
(noting that the procedure for implementing an incompetent patient's right to refuse
treatment must not be so cumbersome as to eliminate the right).
46. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
47. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286 (1990)
(acknowledging that even close family members may not be entirely disinterested
decision-makers); Ardath A. Hamann, Family Surrogate Laws: A Necessary Supplement to
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for persons with disabilities argue that a competent individual's
evaluation of the burden of a given medical disability is unlikely to
reflect how burdensome the person living with that disability
considers it.49 Even though this valuation discrepancy is not
inevitable, the best interests test could result in termination of care
for some incompetent disabled adults because the competent
decision-makers, whether judges or guardians, think that they would
not want to live under such conditions. The decision-maker might
place greater weight on the burdens of treatment and less weight on
the benefits of living than the patient would. 50
Despite its drawbacks, the standard applicable in the case of a
never-competent patient should be the best interests standard. 51 For
a never-competent patient, like Cartrette, who is neither in a PVS nor
terminally ill,52 the best interests test should result in continuation of
treatment.53 For such patients, the significant state interest in
Living Wills andDurable Powers of Attorney, 38 VILL. L. REv. 103, 117 (1993) (discussing
how the best interest test places the patient at the mercy of the decision maker's personal
value system).
48. See Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARv. L. REv. 375, 445
(1988) (discussing courts' leniency in allowing unrelated surrogates to terminate life
support).
49. Jill A. Rhymes, M.D., et al., Withdrawing Very Low-Burden Interventions in
ChronicallyIll Patients, 283 JAMA 1061, 1063 (" 'Observers of persons who are disabled
frequently underestimate the quality of life experienced by those persons.' ") (quoting A.
Leplege & S. Hunt, The Problem of Quality of Life in Medicine, 278 JAMA 47-50 (1997)).
One commentator explained that a logical difficulty is inherent in this method of decisionmaking as applied to never-competent patients.
That difficulty proceeds from the realization that reasonably healthy persons
cannot weigh the burden of treatment against the benefit of life in a diminished
state ... [They cannot] dispassionately weigh a life of disease or incompetence;
the prospect of trading rationality for confusion, comprehension for
bewilderment, asks too much of those who must choose between the two from
the perspective of health.
EDWARD D. ROBERTSON, JR., PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT:
LEGAL ISSUES IN MEDICAL DECISIONS FOR INCOMPETENT PATIENTS 39 (1991).

50. However, one commentator found that more often, the best interest standard
results in continuation of treatment, rather than withdrawal. Robertson, supra note 49, at
51.
51. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 40, at 132-36; In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64,
72 (N.Y. 1981) (finding it unrealistic to try to determine what a never-competent patient
would have wanted regarding potentially life prolonging treatment); American Academy
of Pediatrics, Guidelines on Forgoing Life-sustaining Medical Treatment (RE9406), 93
PEDIATRICS 532-36 (Mar. 1994) available at http://www.aap.orglpolicy/00118.html (last
visited Sept. 26, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
52. In re Cartrette, No. 90-SP-35 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2000) (stating that as a
matter of fact Cartrette is neither "terminally and incurably ill," comatose, in a persistent
vegetative state, nor "in the process of dying").
53. See McKnight & Bellis, supra note 1, at 207 (permitting termination of treatment
for never-competent public wards only when the patient is PVS or terminally ill).
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preserving life and the "irreversible nature of the decision" to
withdraw life-support favor continuation of treatment. 4 Courts that
have recognized the right of an incompetent non-PVS patient to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment have only allowed a surrogate
decision-maker to exercise that right on the patient's behalf when the

patient was either previously competent and indicated his desires, 55 or

was terminally ill and the treatment was viewed as prolonging life

temporarily rather than permanently. 6 Such cases provide little
guidance for patients in Cartrette's situation.
In Cartrette's case, application of the best interests test should

result in continuation of Cartrette's life-support because, as
Cartrette's physicians testified, she is not "terminal and incurable,"
comatose, in a persistent vegetative state, or "in the process of
dying. 57 The court found as a matter of fact that the cause of her

temporary hospitalization had been treated successfully and Cartrette
had returned to her baseline condition-the same condition she had
been in for the past fourteen years-at the time her guardian decided
to terminate treatment. 8 Because her disability is not a terminal
illness, continuation of life-support will not merely result in "some
uncertain but limited extension of life."5 9 The status quo for Cartrette
has been dependence upon tube feeding, hydration, and medication.

54. Spahn v. Eisenberg, 563 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Wis. 1997) (refusing to allow
termination of nutrition and hydration for a terminally ill, non-PVS patient who did not
clearly state her intent to have life-support withheld under her current condition). E.g.,
Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that a
PVS patient is unable to sense painful stimuli). Conversely, life support may be withheld
if the treatment itself would cause undue suffering only to result in "some uncertain but
limited extension of life." Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417,419 (Mass. 1977).
55. See In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 615 (N.Y. 1988) (stating
that even though an irreparably brain damaged patient previously, while competent,
indicated her desire not to have extraordinary treatment under her present situation, her
daughters cannot refuse insertion of a feeding tube because the patient never specifically
mentioned her desires concerning nutrition and hydration).
56. See, e.g., In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3, 6 (Ga. 1992) (noting a lack of state interest to
sustain the life of a terminally-ill child with degenerative neurological disease); In re
Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115, 117-20 (Mass. 1980) (allowing life-prolonging hemodialysis to be
withheld from conscious but profoundly senile and terminally ill patient); Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d at 435 (allowing life-prolonging chemotherapy to be withheld from a profoundly
retarded, terminally ill leukemia patient when treatment would not cure the leukemia); In
re Hier, 464 N.E.2d 959, 964-65 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) (upholding the denial of
gastrostomy-highly intrusive surgery necessary for providing nutrition-from an
incompetent patient pursuant to the substitute judgment test).
57. In re Cartrette, 35-SP-90 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2000).
58. Id.

59. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 419; In re Cartrette, 35-SP-90 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 14,
2000).
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She is not similar to an unsuspecting patient who will be confused and
mentally anguished over unfamiliar, intrusive treatment ° Finally,
the discontinuation of life-support would essentially starve and
dehydrate Cartrette, ultimately causing a very painful death.61 Under
these circumstances, it would be in Cartrette's best interests to remain

on life-support and continue living her normal life.
Furthermore, Cartrette's mother's decision to withdraw lifesupport absent any subjective evidence of Cartrette's wishes, or any
objective basis for finding that it would be in her daughter's best
interests is fundamentally a quality of life decision. Cartrette's

mother is imposing her moral and philosophical view as to what
quality of life is worth living. Even though, arguably, a patient's
mother would be the preferred decision-maker,62 reliance solely on a
quality of life assessment as the basis for surrogate decision-making
for a never-competent patient should not be allowed under any test.63
60. Cf Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
61. Under PVS conditions, some courts have allowed termination of life support,
including nutrition and hydration, with the comfort of knowing that the patient will not
suffer pain from the withdrawal. Id. When the incompetent patient is terminally ill, but
aware, the courts have determined that life support may be terminated if it would be in the
best interest of the patient and the patient will not experience pain in the withholding of
treatment. See id. at 421.
62. Courts give deference to the judgment of family members in determining whether
to terminate life-support for incompetent patients. Such deference, however, should be
limited to situations in which the patient was previously competent, and the family is in the
best position to consider the patient's present values and beliefs, and to determine what
the patient would have wanted. See In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (N.J. 1987) (giving
deference to family members' decision regarding termination of life-support for a
previously competent PVS patient). But cf Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 286 (1990) ("[T]here is no automatic assurance that the view of close family
members will necessarily be the same as the patient's would have been had she been
confronted with the prospect of her situation while competent.").
63. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 432 (rejecting consideration of the patient's quality of life
as it relates to the valuation of the patient's ability to experience life in his mentally
disabled state, but not as it relates to the pain and disorientation that would result from
chemotherapy); Pellegrino, supra note 43, at 1066 (stating that quality of life is a morally
acceptable criterion for the surrogate to consider only when the incompetent patient
previously indicated a desire to terminate life-support under similar conditions); American
Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 51, at 532-36 (stating that "quality of life" pertains only
to how the patient perceives her existence); see also Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp.,
Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 635 (Mass. 1986) (suggesting that quality of life decisions should be
left to the individual, and the court's role should be limited to "ensuring that a refusal of
treatment does not violate legal norms"); Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d
185, 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that courts are not well-qualified to decide by
weighing the benefits and burdens of treatment because such a decision "engages personal
and medical values, including ideas about the quality of life"); Garloch, supra note 2
(quoting a statement from the Assistant Director of Programs for Accessible Living that
" 'We can't define quality of life for someone like that. Maybe just being alive is fine for
her.' ").
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When all that remains is a quality of life decision, courts prefer to err
on the side of life.' 4 North Carolina courts should recognize the
imperfect application of the substitute judgment test to the case of a
never-competent patient, and instead look to the best interests test.
Given that Cartrette is neither terminally ill, nor in a PVS, the courts
should follow other jurisdictions addressing similar issues and deny
the guardian's decision to terminate life-support, erring, if at all, on
the side of life.
JENNIFER L. SABO

64. See In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1030, (E.D. Va. 1993) (discussing a
presumption in favor of life deriving from the U.S. CONST. amend. V and XIV, VA.
CONST., Art. 1, §§ 1 and 11); Rasmussen By Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 691 (Ariz.
1987) (arguing that because of the irreversible nature of a decision to terminate treatment
the court will assume the patient wishes to continue treatment); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d
1209, 1233 (NJ. 1985) ("When evidence of a person's wishes or physical or mental
condition is equivocal, it is best to err, if at all, in favor of preserving life."); see also
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1140 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that
patients are best served by "maintaining a presumption in favor of sustaining life") (citing
Report of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research).
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